A Unified Theory Of Party Competition

, by James F. Adams , Samuel Merrill III , Bernard Grofman

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ISBN: 9780521544931 | 0521544939
Cover: Paperback
Copyright: 3/21/2005

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This book integrates spatial and behavioral perspectives - in a word, those of the Rochester and Michigan schools - into a unified theory of voter choice and party strategy. The theory encompasses both policy and non-policy factors, effects of turnout, voter discounting of party promises, expectations of coalition governments, and party motivations based on policy as well as office. Optimal (Nash equilibrium) strategies are determined for alternative models for presidential elections in the US and France, and for parliamentary elections in Britain and Norway. These polities cover a wide range of electoral rules, number of major parties, and governmental structures. The analyses suggest that the more competitive parties generally take policy positions that come close to maximizing their electoral support, and that these vote-maximizing positions correlate strongly with the mean policy positions of their supporters.

List of Tables and Figures

Acknowledgments

xvii

1 Modeling Party Competition

(14)

1.1 Introduction to the Unified Theory of Party Competition

(4)

1.2 Data and Methodology

(1)

1.3 Justifying Our Theoretical Focus: Why Assume a Unified Model of Party Competition with Vote-Maximizing Parties?

(4)

1.4 Plan of the Book

(5)

2 How Voters Decide: The Components of the Unified Theory of Voting

(13)

2.1 Introduction

(1)

2.2 The Policy-Only Model

(3)

2.3 Nonpolicy Factors: The Unified Model

(4)

2.4 The Unified Discounting Model

(3)

2.5 Discussion

(2)

3 Linking Voter Choice to Party Strategies: Illustrating the Role of Nonpolicy Factors

(24)

3.1 Introduction

(3)

3.2 The Logic of Policy Competition in the Unified Spatial Model: Illustrative Examples of How Nonpolicy Considerations Matter

(9)

3.3 Party Competition and the Concept of Equilibrium in Policy Strategies

(6)

3.4 Empirical Application to the 1988 French Presidential Election

(6)

4 Factors Influencing the Link between Party Strategy and the Variables Affecting Voter Choice: Theoretical Results

(20)

4.1 Introduction

(1)

4.2 The Model

(4)

4.3 Centrifugal Incentives for Candidate Strategies

(6)

4.4 An Empirical Illustration

(4)

4.5 Robustness of Equilibrium Positions to the Salience of Partisanship

(3)

4.6 Discussion

(2)

5 Policy Competition under the Unified Theory: Empirical Applications to the 1988 French Presidential Election

(22)

5.1 Introduction

(1)

5.2 The Context of the 1988 French Presidential Election

(4)

5.3 Candidate Competition under the Policy-Only Model

(2)

5.4 Candidate Competition under a Unified Model with Nonpolicy Factors

(6)

5.5 Candidate Competition under a Unified Discounting Model

(8)

5.6 Conclusion

(1)

6 Policy Competition under the Unified Theory: Empirical Applications to the 1989 Norwegian Parliamentary Election

(23)

6.1 Introduction

(2)

6.2 Ideology and Policy Issues in the 1989 Parliamentary Election

(3)

6.3 Party Competition in the Policy-Only Model

(3)

6.4 Party Competition in the Unified Model

102

(3)

6.5 Party Competition in a Unified Discounting Model

105

(6)

6.6 Coalition-Seeking Motivations

111

(5)

6.7 Conclusion

116

(1)

7 The Threat of Abstention: Candidate Strategies and Policy Representation in U.S. Presidential Elections

117

(15)

7.1 Introduction

117

(3)

7.2 Incorporating the Turnout Decision into the Unified Voting Model

120

(3)

7.3 Candidate Strategies under the Unified Turnout Model: Illustrative Arguments

123

(7)

7.4 Conclusion

130

(2)

8 Candidate Strategies with Voter Abstention in U.S. Presidential Elections: 1980, 1984, 1988, 1996, and 2000

132

(20)

8.1 Introduction

132

(1)

8.2 Hypotheses on Voting Behavior and Candidate Strategies under the Unified Turnout Model

133

(1)

8.3 Candidate Competition in the 1988 American Presidential Election

134

(8)

8.4 Unified Turnout Models for the 1980, 1984, 1988, 1996, and 2000 U.S. Presidential Elections

142

(2)

8.5 Candidate Equilibrium under the Unified Turnout Model

144

(3)

8.6 The Unified Turnout Model with Policy Discounting

147

(3)

8.7 Discussion

150

(2)

9 Policy Competition in Britain: The 1997 General Election

152

(18)

9.1 Introduction

152

(2)

9.2 Ideology and Policy Issues in the 1997 General Election

154

(2)

9.3 Party Competition under the Policy-Only Model

156

(4)

9.4 Party Competition under the Unified Model

160

(4)

9.5 Party Competition under a Unified Turnout Model: The Strategic Effects of Abstention due to Alienation

164

(4)

9.6 Conclusion

168

(2)

10 The Consequences of Voter Projection: Assimilation and Contrast Effects

170

(14)

10.1 Introduction

170

(1)

10.2 Data Analysis

171

(11)

10.3 Discussion

182

(2)

11 Policy-Seeking Motivations of Parties in Two-Party Elections: Theory

184

(17)

11.1 Introduction

184

(3)

11.2 Spatial Models with Full Information: How Valence Advantages Motivate Divergence between Policy-Seeking Candidates

187

(1)

11.3 A Policy-Seeking Model with Incomplete Information, Part 1: The Effects of Uncertainty about the Impact of Valence Issues

188

(7)

11.4 A Policy-Seeking Model with Incomplete Information, Part 2: The Effects of Uncertainty about the Voter Distribution

195

(4)

11.5 Conclusion

199

(2)

12 Policy-Seeking Motivations of Parties in Two-Party Elections: Empirical Analysis

201

(26)

12.1 Introduction

201

(3)

12.2 Equilibrium Strategies under Electoral Certainty

204

(4)

12.3 Modeling Election Uncertainty over Valence Issues in Empirical Applications

208

(4)

12.4 Candidate Equilibria under Valence-Related Election Uncertainty

212

(10)

12.5 Equilibria under Policy-Related Uncertainty: Application to France

222

(3)

12.6 Discussion

225

(2)

13 Concluding Remarks

227

(14)

13.1 Introduction

227

(5)

13.2 Evaluating the Unified Model: Does It Satisfactorily Explain Party Behavior?

232

(2)

13.3 Directions for Future Research

234

(5)

13.4 Final Remarks

239

(2)

Appendix 1.1 Literature Review: Work Linking Behavioral Research to Spatial Modeling

241

(4)

Appendix 2.1 Alternative Statistical Models of Voter Choice

245

(2)

Appendix 2.2 Controversies in Voting Research: The Electoral Impact of Party Identification

247

(4)

Appendix 2.3 Relationship between the Unified Discounting Model and the Directional Model of Rabinowitz and Macdonald

251

(3)

Appendix 3.1 Spatial Models That Incorporate Valence Dimensions of Candidate Evaluation

254

(4)

Appendix 4.1 Uniqueness Theorem and Algorithm for Computing Nash Equilibria

258

(5)

Appendix 4.2 Proof of Theorem 4.1

263

(2)

Appendix 4.3 Simulation Analysis and an Approximation Formula for Nash Equilibria

265

(3)

Appendix 4.4 Derivations of Formulas Relating Electoral Factors to the Shrinkage Factor, ck

268

(2)

Appendix 6.1 Equilibria for Outcome-Oriented Motivations: The Kedar Model

270

(5)

Appendix 7.1 Proof of Lemma 7.1

275

(2)

Appendix 7.2 Derivations for the Unified Turnout Model

277

(2)

Appendix 8.1 Coding and Model Specifications

279

(3)

Appendix 8.2 Alternative Turnout Models

282

(5)

Appendix 11.1 Proof of Theorem 11.1

287

(2)

Appendix 11.2 Empirical Estimation of the Mean and Standard Deviation of Valence Effects

289

(4)

References

293

(14)

Index

307

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A Unified Theory Of Party Competition

Summary

Table of Contents

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