Weakness of Will and Practical Irrationality

Among the many practical failures that threaten us, weakness of will orakrasia is often considered to be a paradigm of irrationality. The eleven newessays in this collection, written by an excellent international team ofphilosophers, some well-established, some younger scholars, give a rich overviewof the current debate over weakness of will and practical irrationality moregenerally. Issues covered include classical questions such as the distinctionbetween weakness and compulsion, the connection between evaluative judgement andmotivation, the role of emotions in akrasia, rational agency, and the existenceof the will. The also include new topics, such as group akrasia, strength ofwill, the nature of correct choice, the structure of decision theory, thetemporality of prudential reasons, and emotional rationality. Because thesequestions cut across philosophy of mind and ethics, the collection will beessential reading for scholars, postgraduates, and upper-level undergraduates inboth these fields.