What Makes the EU Viable? European Integration in the Light of the Antebellum US Experience

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ISBN: 9780230224506 | 0230224504
Cover: Hardcover
Copyright: 8/15/2009

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This book is distinguished by its use of the antebellum US experience as a foil to address the under-explored question of what makes the EU viable. The nature of political conflict in both cases is defined in terms of four contested rules of the game: state sovereignty, federal competences, political representation and decision-making procedures. Hence, viability is conceptualized as the ability to find an agreement over these four elements.

List of Tables	p. x
Acknowledgements	p. xi
Introduction: Questioning What Makes the EU Viable	p. 1
The Problem of Viability in a Compound Polity	p. 7
Introduction	p. 7
Viability as defined in relation to the 'Rules of the Game' of politics	p. 8
Scenarios of viability in a compound polity	p. 15
The Theory of the compound polity and the issue of the units' sovereign status	p. 20
Comparing the EU with other political systems	p. 24
Conclusion	p. 31
Developing an Analogical Comparison between the EU and the Antebellum US Republic	p. 32
Introduction	p. 32
The attraction of transatlantic comparison	p. 33
The caesura of the Civil War: The overlooked significance of antebellum political conflict	p. 37
Comparing viability in the EU and antebellum US: A question of praxis not preconditions	p. 43
Conclusion: Learning through analogy	p. 51
Comparing How the Rules of the Game are Contested	p. 53
Introduction	p. 53
Viability and the conflict over the rules of the game of politics in the antebellum US	p. 54
Contesting the rules of the game in the EU	p. 63
Dual federalism v. joint federalism	p. 66
A constitution for popular government v. a treaty system	p. 67
A project for freedom v. a project for undefined ever close union	p. 69
A single fault line v. multiple fault lines	p. 70
A party system and Supreme Court arbitrator v. politics of treaty reform and council arbitration	p. 71
Conclusion	p. 73
The Struggle to Maintain a Compound System: Creating and Contesting the Rules of the Game in European Integration	p. 74
Introduction	p. 74
The construction of the rules of the game of European politics, from the ECSC to the EEC	p. 75
The Coal and Steel Community	p. 76
The European Economic Community	p. 79
After the EEC: Unexpected constitutionalization (ECJ), the first enlargement (UK) and democratic consolidation (Mediterranean enlargement)	p. 81
The impact of the court on the rules of the game	p. 82
British accession: Opening up the Pandora's box of domestic politics	p. 86
The Mediterranean enlargement round: Defining the Community's democratic values	p. 93
Maastricht and after: Questioning the purpose and nature of integration	p. 97
Two steps forward but how many back? European integration's dynamic equilibrium	p. 107
Conclusion	p. 112
Contrasting and Explaining the Viability of Two Compound Systems	p. 113
Introduction	p. 113
American dual federalism (with the highest functions of government) v. European joint federalism (with the most numerous)	p. 115
A constitution for popular government v. a treaty system	p. 118
A project for freedom (the union as a means to an end) v. a project for undefined ever closer union (integration as an end in itself)	p. 125
A single fault line v. multiple fault lines	p. 131
A party system and Supreme Court arbitrator v. politics of treaty reform and Council arbitration	p. 138
Conclusion: Recognizing what makes the EU viable	p. 150
The Future Evolution of the EU Compound Polity: The Obstacles to Voluntary Centralization	p. 152
Introduction	p. 152
Dynamic equilibrium: A self-reinforcing process?	p. 154
Compound polities and the problem of representing both states and individuals	p. 161
How to manage the voluntary centralization of representation	p. 169
The political process needed for justifying voluntary centralization	p. 173
Conclusion	p. 180
Conclusion: Implications for EU studies and the Debate over the Future of Integration	p. 182
Applying the insights of this study	p. 184
Notes	p. 189
Bibliography	p. 206
Index	p. 224
Table of Contents provided by Ingram. All Rights Reserved.

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What Makes the EU Viable? European Integration in the Light of the Antebellum US Experience

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