Asymmetric Warfare in South Asia: The Causes

The 1999 conflict between India and Pakistan near the town of Kargil in contested Kashmir was the first military clash between two nuclear-armed powers since the 1969 Sino-Soviet war. Kargil was a landmark event not because of its duration or casualties, but because it contained a very real risk of nuclear escalation. Until the Kargil conflict, academic and policy debates over nuclear deterrence and proliferation occurred largely on the theoretical level. This deep analysis of the conflict offers scholars and policymakers a rare account of how nuclear-armed states interact during military crisis. Written by analysts from India, Pakistan, and the United States, this unique book draws extensively on primary sources, including unprecedented access to Indian, Pakistani, and U.S. government officials and military officers who were actively involved in the conflict. This is the first rigorous and objective account of the causes, conduct, and consequences of the Kargil conflict.

List of maps and tables	p. ix
List of contributors	p. x
Preface	p. xiii
List of abbreviations and acronyms	p. xv
Introduction: the importance of the Kargil conflict	p. 1
Why this study matters	p. 2
Controversies clarified	p. 5
The Kargil conflict in context	p. 14
Enduring rivalry in South Asia	p. 23
The nuclear revolution reconsidered	p. 29
Causes and conduct of the conflict	p. 39
The strategic context of the Kargil conflict: a Pakistani perspective	p. 41
Introduction	p. 41
The historical rationale	p. 42
FCNA and the Northern Areas	p. 49
Contemporary rationale: the Siachen Glacier	p. 52
The Kashmir uprising: the Line of Control and the Neelum Valley	p. 55
Pakistan's official version	p. 57
Potential objectives of the Kargil conflict	p. 61
Conclusion	p. 62
Pakistan's motivations and calculations for the Kargil conflict	p. 64
A history of grievance	p. 68
Restoring honor	p. 74
The immediate cause of Kargil	p. 80
A new chain of command	p. 83
Assumptions and miscalculations	p. 86
Conclusion	p. 90
	p. 92
Prelude to conflict	p. 93
Buildup: local and national	p. 105
Indian counteroffensive	p. 114
Combat operations: an assessment	p. 120
Observations	p. 123
American diplomacy and the 1999 Kargil Summit at Blair House	p. 130
Prologue	p. 130
Introduction	p. 132
Kargil and Kashmir	p. 132
Nawaz calls for help	p. 135
The 4th dawns	p. 137
Aftermath: new deal in New Delhi, coup in Islamabad	p. 141
Kargil: the nuclear dimension	p. 144
Prelude to Kargil: the May 1998 tests	p. 146
Kargil as a nuclear crisis	p. 155
Post-Kargil interaction: the nuclear dimension	p. 161
Conclusion	p. 167
Why Kargil did not produce general war: the crisis-management strategies of Pakistan, India, and the United States	p. 171
South Asia's nuclear revolution	p. 172
Pakistan's calculations	p. 177
India's conflict-termination strategy	p. 190
International diplomacy	p. 197
Conclusion	p. 204
Consequences and impact of the conflict	p. 207
Surprise at the top of the world: India's systemic and intelligence failure	p. 209
The theory of surprise	p. 211
The fait accompli at Kargil	p. 215
Planning the fait accompli: the view from Pakistan	p. 216
Ripe for surprise: the view from India	p. 219
Problems with India's intelligence organizations	p. 220
Conclusion	p. 228
Militants in the Kargil conflict: myths, realities, and impacts	p. 231
Background: origins of the myth	p. 231
Pakistan's internal dynamics	p. 236
Impact in the Valley of Kashmir	p. 244
Impact on Pakistan's foreign relations	p. 248
Conclusion	p. 256
The impact of the Kargil conflict and Kashmir on Indian politics and society	p. 258
Popular culture	p. 259
The Kargil election	p. 263
The Kargil war and the conflict in Kashmir	p. 270
Conclusion: war, terrorists, and temples	p. 277
The Kargil conflict's impact on Pakistani politics and society	p. 280
The Pakistani print media's Kargil	p. 282
The domestic political impact	p. 289
The religious parties outflank the mainstream	p. 290
Political management and mismanagement	p. 296
The coup and its aftermath	p. 304
Conclusion	p. 306
Lessons learned	p. 309
The lessons of Kargil as learned by India	p. 311
Organizational lessons	p. 313
Strategic lessons	p. 320
Conclusion: lessons well learned?	p. 328
The lessons of Kargil as learned by Pakistan	p. 333
Military learning in South Asia	p. 334
Misperceiving others: Pakistani perceptions of international response	p. 337
The harsh spotlight	p. 340
Operational lessons	p. 346
Assessment of the conflict	p. 349
Conclusion: has Pakistan learned?	p. 350
The Kargil crisis: lessons learned by the United States	p. 353
Lessons for US relations with India and Pakistan	p. 354
Lessons for nuclear stability and nonproliferation policy	p. 359
Lessons for future engagement	p. 365
Conclusion	p. 373
Kargil, deterrence, and international relations theory	p. 377
Introduction	p. 377
Nature of the puzzle	p. 379
Routes to Kargil	p. 381
Surprise	p. 387
Nuclear weapons, nuclear wars	p. 388
Conclusion	p. 396
Index	p. 398
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Asymmetric Warfare in South Asia: The Causes and Consequences of the Kargil Conflict

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