The New Counter-insurgency Era in Critical Perspective

Over the last decade, the notion of counter-insurgency (COIN) has risen to prominence as the dominant paradigm in American and British thinking about the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Despite the high level of attention paid to the subject by military analysts, the broader theoretical and historical factors which underpin counter-insurgency have received comparatively little critical scrutiny. This volume addresses the gap in existing scholarship by exploring and challenging several critical aspects of the prevailing orthodoxy on COIN.

This critical reappraisal of counter-insurgency thinking and practice brings together a number of international academics and practitioners, providing a pluralistic insight on the effectiveness of counter-insurgency operations from military, academic, media and civilian administrative perspectives. It also combines US and British insights into the theory and practise of twenty-first century COIN. With the continuing relevance of 'big third party' COIN to Western engagement in future wars of choice, this book provides an important and timely analysis of an issue which will continue to impact American and British security policy and future interventions.

This book will appeal to scholars of Military Studies, Strategic Studies, Security Studies and International Relations and to practitioners and policy-makers working in the field of counter-insurgency.

David Martin Jones is Associate Professor in the School of Political Science and International Studies at the University of Queensland, Australia. He has taught history of political ideas and political development, revolution and state breakdown in Canada, the United Kingdom, Singapore, Malaysia and Australia.

Celeste Ward Gventer is Associate Director at the Robert S. Strauss Center for International Security and Law, USA. She was a Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense and served two tours in Iraq, including as the Political Advisor to the Commanding General of Multinational Corps Iraq in 2006. She received a Bachelor of Arts degree in Political Science from Stanford University and a Master of Public Policy degree from the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, and is a PhD student in History at the University of Texas at Austin.

M.L.R. Smith is Professor of Strategic Theory in the Department of War Studies, King's College, University of London, UK. He has held previous posts as Senior Lecturer in the Department of History and International Affairs at the Royal Naval College, Greenwich and the Defence Studies Department, Joint Services Command and Staff College, UK. He has also held posts as Lecturer in the Department of History, National University of Singapore (1992-1995) and as Consultant and Principal Lecturer at the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore (1997-2001).

Introduction; Celeste Ward Gventer, David Martin Jones and M.L.R Smith
PART I: COUNTERINSURGENCY: HISTORY AND THEORY
1. Minting New COIN: Critiquing Counter-insurgency Theory; David Martin Jones, Celeste Ward Gventer and M.L.R Smith
2. COIN and the Chameleon: The Categorical Errors of Trying to Divide the Indivisible; M.L.R Smith
3. Our Own Worst Enemy: The Unspoken Paradox of Large-Scale Expeditionary COIN; Jeffrey Michaels
4. Government in a Box? Counter-insurgency, State Building, and the Technocratic Conceit; Colin Jackson
5. 'Our Ghettos, Too, Need a Lansdale': American Counter-insurgency Abroad and at Home in the Vietnam Era; William Rosenau
6. Bringing The Soil Back In: Control and Territoriality in Western and Non-Western COIN; James Worrall
7. Counter-insurgency and Violence Management; Paul Staniland
8. Mass, Methods, and Means: The Northern Ireland 'Model' of Counter-insurgency; John Bew
9. David Galula and the Revival of COIN in the US Military; Douglas Porch
PART II: COUNTER-INSURGENCY IN IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN?
10.Testing the Surge: Why Did Violence Decline in Iraq in 2007?; Stephen Biddle, Jeffrey A. Friedman and Jacob N. Shapiro
11. After a Decade of Counter-insurgency, Eliminate Nation-building from US Military Manuals; Bing West
12. The Conceit of American Counter-insurgency; Gian Gentile
13. 'The Population is the Enemy': Control, Behaviour, and Counter-insurgency in Central Helmand Province, Afghanistan; Ryan Evans
14. The Reluctant Counter-insurgents: Britain's Absent Surge in Southern Iraq; Huw Bennett
PART III: COUNTER-INSURGENCY AND FUTURE WARFARE
15. Questions about COIN after Iraq and Afghanistan; Joshua Rovner
16. The Military Utility & Interventions Post-Afghanistan: Reassessing Ends, Ways and Means; Matthew Ford
17. 'What Do We Do If We Are Never Going to Do This Again: Western Counter-insurgency Choices after Iraq and Afghanistan'; Paul Schulte